Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 9
Issue 4 Summer 1978

Article 4

1978

A Reconsideration of the Religious Exemption:
The Need for Financial Disclosure of Religious
Fund Raising and Solicitation Practices
Bruce J. Rakay
Chief, Charitable Foundations Section, Office of the Ohio Attorney General

Roger P. Sugarman
Assist. Attorney General, Charitable Foundations Section, Office of the Ohio Attorney General

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Religion Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Bruce J. Rakay, & Roger P. Sugarman, A Reconsideration of the Religious Exemption: The Need for Financial Disclosure of Religious Fund
Raising and Solicitation Practices, 9 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 863 (1978).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol9/iss4/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

A Reconsideration Of The Religious Exemption: The
Need For Financial Disclosure Of Religious Fund
Raising And Solicitation Practices
BRUCE J. RAKAY*
ROGER P. SUGARMAN**
INTRODUCTION

Public awareness of abuses in the administration of charitable
fund raising practices has increased over the past twenty years.,
This has resulted in the promulgation of state registration and reporting statutes,2 together with increased supervision of charities
and enforcement by the state attorneys general.3 By the end of 1977,
thirty-four states and the District of Columbia had enacted statutes
requiring financial disclosure of contributions and fund raising costs
by charitable organizations which solicited money from the public.,
However, virtually every state, with the recent exceptions of North
Carolina and Maryland,5 has followed the Uniform Supervision of
* Chief, Charitable Foundations Section, Office of the Ohio Attorney General, Columbus,
Ohio; B.A., Case Western Reserve University 1970; J.D., Boston University School of Law,
1973.
** Assistant Attorney General, Charitable Foundations Section, Office of the Ohio Attorney General, Columbus, Ohio; B.A., Vanderbilt University 1972; J.D., University of Toledo
College of Law, 1975.
This article does not necessarily reflect the views of the Office of the Ohio Attorney General.
However, the authors thank Attorney General William J. Brown for his permission to write
this article.
1. See, e.g., Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976); Heslin v. Korean Cultural
& Freedom Found., Inc., No. 208480 (Super. Ct. Hartford Co., Conn., Aug. 26, 1977); State
v. Lake, No. 77-19982, C.P. (Circuit Ct. Ingham Co., Mich., Mar. 9, 1977); Hyland v. Congress of Racial Equality (C.O.R.E.), No. C-5087-75 (Super. Ct. Essex Co., N.J., Mar. 10,
1977); Heslin v. Martin, No. 211882 (Super. Ct., Hartford Co., Conn., June 16, 1977); Brown
v. Pallottines, Inc., No. 76-CV-12-5068 (CCP, Franklin Co., Ohio, Dec. 1, 1976); State v.
Nordmark & Hood Presentations, Inc., No. 421683 (Dist. Ct., Ramsey Co., Minn., Aug. 23,
1977); Kelley v. Routley, No. 77-20879 CCP (Cir. Ct., Ingham Co., Mich., temporary restraining order issued Oct. 18, 1977); Brown v. National Fed. of the Blind, No. 76-CV-12-5365
(CCP, Franklin Co., Ohio, Dec. 21, 1976).
2. Report of the Ohio Attorney General to the Commission on PrivatePhilanthropy and
Public Needs: The Status of State Regulation of Charitable Trusts, Foundations and
Solicitations, Vol. V at 2705, Research Papers Sponsored by the Commission on Private
Philanthropy and Public Needs (1977) (hereinafter cited as Report of the Ohio Attorney
General); State Regulation of Charitable Trusts and Solicitations, National Association of
Attorneys General Foundation (August 1977).
3. Report of the Ohio Attorney General, supra note 2, at 2755-61.
4. Abernathy, Guide to State Laws Regulating Fund Raising, GRANTSMANSHiP NEws (Oct.
1976) (hereinafter cited as Abernathy).
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 108-75.1. et seq. (1977 Supp.); MD. CODE ANN. art. 41, §§ 103A et
seq. (1977 Supp.); see text accompanying notes 124-42 infra.
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Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act 6 and exempted religious organizations from these requirements. Broad exemptions for religious
charities stem from the belief that, in the absence of an exemption,
insurmountable constitutional difficulties would be encountered.
The Pallottine scandal in Baltimore provides a recent and graphic
example of the type of abuse which disclosure statutes may prevent.
In 1976 it was revealed that of the $20 million raised in contributions
by this Roman Catholic order less than four cents of each dollar was
spent on the charitable purposes for which donations were solicited.7
The Pallottines' annual direct mail fund raising campaign advertised that "money donated will be used to support Pallottine missions in underdeveloped countries around the world." '
The twofold purpose of this article is (1) to explore the constitutional boundaries of permissible governmental regulation of religious charities which publicly solicit contributions;9 and (2) to recommend that fund raising by religious groups, like that of secular
groups, be subject to registration and financial reporting requirements.
6. 9C U.L.A. 208. See also "An Act to Regulate Individuals and Organizations Engaged
in Charitable Public Solicitation", Ad Hoc Committee to Review State Legislation of the
National Health Council (1973). This model legislation also contains a religious exemption.
A critique of the Ad Hoc Committee's Model Act is found in Report of the Ohio Attorney
General, supra note 2, at 2763.
7. Wilson, Charity Scandals: 'Self-Policing Can't Work,' Wash. Post, Jan. 10, 1978, at
A19, col 1. The National Conference of Catholic Bishops, the Leadership Conference of
Women Religious, and the conference of Major Superiors of Men of the Catholic Church have
recently collaborated on new fund raising rules for all Catholic agencies and affiliates, mainly
in response to the Pallottine Missionaries scandal. Principlesand Guidelinesfor Fundraising
in the United States Archdiocese, Archdiocesian Agencies and Religious Institutes (1977).
The Pallottines solicited $20.4 million through a direct mail campaign during an 18-month
period ending December 31, 1975. Only $500,000 was used for charitable purposes. For a
concise history of voluntary financial disclosure on the part of the American Catholic Church
and its affiliates, see Scheets, The Church Needs More Open Fiscal Policies,NATIONAL CATHOLIC REPORTER (February 20, 1976).
8. Archbishop Eyes Fund-Raising Law, Wash. Post, May 4, 1976, at Cl, col. 6. For
discussions concerning other fund raising abuses see MacRaye, The Lord Will Provide, Wash.
Post, Sept. 1, 1974, at Al, col. 6; Sept. 2, 1974, at Al, col. 5; Sept. 3, 1974, at Al, col. 5; M.
LARSON & C. LOWELL, THE RELIGIoUs EMPIRE (1976); H. KATZ, GrvE! WHO GETS YOUR CHARITY
DOLLAR? (1974); ALFRED, THE RELIGIous BusINEss (1974); Charities:Don't Feel Guilty About
Unwanted Gifts, Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 20, 1974, at F4, col. 1; Rashke, Fundraising
"Smell" Ignored 7 Years, National Catholic Reporter, Jan. 30, 1976, at 6; $1 Billion Fund
Drive Set By Evangelicals, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1977, at 19, col. 2.
9. It is necessary to recognize the distinction between public contributions and sacramental offerings or congregational dues. The latter monies are generally allocated for spiritual
well-being, propogation of the faith, or worship, and come from donors who are members of
or have a direct connection with the donee religious organization. Public contributions are
those which are donated by persons outside the direct membership of the religious organization.
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GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION AND THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

An analysis of the constitutional parameters of permissible governmental regulation of religious charities includes consideration of
financial disclosure statutes" and legislation implementing the taxation authority of federal, state, and local governments." While
legislation in the first category generally requires charitable organizations to describe the ongoing financial nature of their fund raising,
administrative and service activities," tax statutes contain no specific charitable solicitation regulations. 3 Disclosure statutes almost
10. In addition to the state and territorial statutes mentioned in Abernathy, supra note
4, and Report of the Attorney General, supra note 2 at 2755, there are numerous municipal
ordinances which require some form of registration and reporting on the part of charities
soliciting within the confines of the municipal jurisdiction.
At the present time no federal statutes govern interstate solicitations by public charities
per se although the Postal Service does have jurisdiction to prosecute instances of civil and
criminal fraud, of either a commercial or charitable nature. 39 U.S.C. § 3005, 3007 (1970 &
Supp. IV 1974); 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970). Charities which use the mails to solicit contributions
are subject to disqualification from the preferential rates they receive for all classes of mail.
39 C.F.R. §§ 132.3(f), 132.8 (1975) (special second class permits); 39 C.F.R. § 134.5(d),(f)
(1975). No permit is required for the fourth class rate, 39 C.F.R. § 135.2(a)(5) (1975).
There have been a number of proposals for federal regulation of charitable solicitations
introduced in the last three sessions of Congress. H.R. 1123, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)
(VanDeerlin bill, originally introduced as H.R. 11991); S. 1153, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)
(the Truth in Contributions Act, introduced in 1975 by Senator Mondale); H.R. 4689, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (introduced by Representative Karth); and H.R. 41, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977) (originally H.R. 10922, reintroduced in 1977 by Representative Wilson). The
Wilson bill is the only federal proposal which, if enacted with its present provisions, would
not exempt religious organizations from the disclosure requirements incumbent upon secular
charities soliciting by means of the U.S. mails. Proposed 39 U.S.C. § 3012(h)(1). See Hearings
on H.R. 41 before Subcommittee on Postal Personnel and Modernization, Committee on
Postal Office and Civil Service, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
11. "Regulation" under the second category may be a misnomer since charities have a
long history, both in Great Britain and the United States, of exemption from all forms of
taxation. See M. FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT 11-53 (1965); E. FISCH, D.
FREED & E. SHACHTER, CHARITIES AND CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS 598 (1974).
The special legislative treatment afforded religious charities, not applicable to secular
charities, by the Internal Revenue Code is relevant to the subject of this article. For example,
churches, their integrated auxiliaries and associations of churches are not required to file
annual returns with the I.R.S. 26 U.S.C. § 6033(a)(2)(A)(i) (1970). See note 70 infra. Prior to
January 1, 1976, churches were also exempt from taxation on unrelated business income,
unlike other federally tax-exempt entities. 26 U.S.C. § 6033(a)(2), 508(a)(1), and 512(b)(16)
(1970).
12. Most state jurisdictions have incorporated accounting requirements established by
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants in its various audit guides. See Gross,
State Compliance Reporting for Nonprofit Organizations,45 C.P.A. J. 33 (April, 1975); Gross,
Nonprofit Accounting: The Continuing Revolution, 143 J. ACCOUNTANCY (June, 1977); M.
GROSS, FINANCIAL AND ACCOUNTING GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (1972).
13. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1970, Supp. 111972, Supp.
IV 1974), falls under this category. Although the IRS does not regulate charitable solicitations
as such, it is provided with mechanisms to handle flagrant fiduciary abuses by charitable
trustees. See Internal Revenue Manual 4(12) 40.323(2)(d) (audits); Internal Revenue Manual
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invariably exempt religious charities from the requirements which
secular charities must meet, but this is not true under the tax laws,
which generally exempt all charities, whether religious or secular in
nature."
The authority to regulate charitable solicitations is derived from
the police powers retained by 5 and inherent in the states.'" As a
general principle, a statute enacted pursuant to a state's police
power will withstand a constitutional attack so long as the means
utilized are "reasonably necessary" for the accomplishment of the
state's purpose, and are not overly oppressive in their effect upon
individuals.' 7 It is thus clear that states have the power to enact
statutes to prevent acts of fraud and deceit upon the public." The
proposition that religious charities be subjected to registration and
reporting requirements comes within this area of permissible exer4(11)(97) (public warning of misleading solicitations in fundraising activities of particular
organizations). Unrelated business income of churches may be audited by the Service pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7605(C) (1970).
14. Included in this category are income, property (real and personal), employment, inheritance and sales taxes. See Note, Constitutionality of Tax Benefits Accorded Religion, 49
COLUM. L. REv. 968, 975-76, 981-82 (1949); see also, Hurvich, Religion and the Taxing Power,
35 U. Cm. L. REv. 531 (1966); Van Alstyne, Tax Exemption of Church Property, 20 OHIO ST.
L.J. 461 (1959). There is little uniformity in these exemption provisions among the federal,
state and local statutes and ordinances. For a cogent study of the benefits afforded charities
through the mechanism of tax exemption, see M. LARSON, & C. LOWELL, PRAISE THE LORD FOR
TAX EXEMPTION

(1969).

15. U.S. CONST. amend. IX, X. See Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976); Staub
v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
16. The term "police power" eludes definitional specifics. Justice Taney broadly defined
it as encompassing "nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty to the extent of its dominions." The License Cases, 46 U.S. 554, 583 (1847). It is
defined narrowly in terms of public health, welfare, safety and morals. In addition, it has been
expressed by the maxim "salus populi suprema lex" (the welfare of the people is the highest
law), St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Mathews, 165 U.S. 1 (1897). This maxim clearly expresses the
concept that everyone's freedom, to some degree, must be restricted in order that others, and
society as a whole, may exercise theirs. Thus in reality the police power is the means by which
society protects its existence. It is the law of necessity, expanding and contracting when
necessary to meet the needs of the public. Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hope, 248 U.S. 498 (1919).
In the American constitutional scheme, all powers not specifically delegated to the federal
government are retained by the people and the states. Since the police power is not a delegated power, it is retained by the people and the states. The people exercise this power
through their representatives in their respective state legislatures, who in turn enact legislation necessary to secure the peace, good order, health, morals and general welfare of the
public. While the police power is very broad it is limited by the federal and state constitutions.
17. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962), citing Lawton v. Steele,
152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
18. Hutchinson Ice Cream Co. v. Iowa, 242 U.S. 153 (1916); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242
U.S. 539 (1917); Double-Eagle Lubricants, Inc. v. State of Texas, 248 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. Tex.
1965).
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cise of police powers.
However, where rights guaranteed by the free exercise clause of
the first amendment are the subject of legislation,'" the standard of
"reasonableness" is replaced by one of "strict scrutiny." 0 The Supreme Court has noted that in this constitutional area, "[o]nly the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for
permissible limitation. '"2"
This judicial warning has prompted legislative bodies unnecessarily to exempt religious organizations from the coverage of statutes
designed to regulate charitable solicitations through a fear of infringing upon the free exercise of religious beliefs." While it is clear
that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the free exercise
clause mandates a complete prohibition of governmental interference with religious beliefs, religious practices, such as public fund
raising, may be subjected to reasonable regulations.13 Thus, statutes
promoting public policy or morals, protecting public health or
safety, imposing criminal sanctions, and promulgating economic
19. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, on or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ..
"The fourteenth amendment guarantees the application of the first amendment to the states. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). The free exercise clause was expressly deemed incorporated in
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) and the establishment clause was incorporated
in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
For an explanation of the relationship between the free exercise and establishment clauses,
see Moore, The Supreme Court and the Relationship between the "Establishment"and "Free
Exercise" Clauses, 42 TEx. L. REV. 143, 147 (1963).
20. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977); Goldblatt v. Town of
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Art Neon Co. v. City and County of Denver, 488 F.2d 118
(10th Cir. 1973); Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 434 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Tex.
1977); Riddle v. Clock, No. CA-3-77-0525-D (N.D. Tex. August 25, 1977).
21. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945), as cited in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 406 (1963).
22. Report of the Attorney General, supra note 2, at 2771.
23. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78
(1944); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
While the judicial reading of the religion clauses of the first amendment has vacillated
between the extremes of the Jeffersonian "wall of separation" and much more flexible interpretations, it seems clear that the Supreme Court now envisions the two clauses somewhere
within the latter category. Thus, in Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v,Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 760 (1973), the Court was impelled to state:
[Tihis Nation's history has not been one of entirely sanitized separation between
Church and State. It has never been thought either possible or desirable to enforce
a regime of total separation, and as a consequence cases arising under these Clauses
have presented some of the most perplexing questions to come before this Court.
A complete history of the origins and development of the religion clauses is found in M.
HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS (1965), and W. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONS (1964). See also C. ANTIEAU, P. CARROLL, & T. BURKE, RELIGION UNDER THE
STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1965).
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regulatory schemes have fared well against first amendment attacks.
In developing a constitutional standard under the free exercise
clause, the Supreme Court has long recognized this. dichotomy between religious beliefs and religious practices. The fund raising activities under consideration here clearly come within the latter category. Reynolds v. United States25 was the earliest case in which the
Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a statute in the
face of a religious challenge. The Court, in upholding a statute
prohibiting polygamy, stated "[laws are made for the government
of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief
' '2
and opinions, they may with practices. 1
Eleven years later in Davis v. Beason," the Supreme Court reexamined its earlier treatment of the Reynolds polygamy statute
and determined that the male members of the Mormon Church
could not justify their violation of the statute even though they
believed the practice to be an integral part of their religious duties.
The Court made it clear that the free exercise clause does not excuse
criminal conduct, at least in so far as such conduct violates the basic
moral values of society:
It was never intended or supposed that the amendment could be
invoked as a protection against legislation for the punishment of
acts inimical to the peace, good order and morals of society ....
24. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, rehearing denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1971) (selective service statute upheld); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (upholding Sunday
"Blue Laws"); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (statute requiring special parade
license upheld); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (statute mandating small pox
vaccination upheld); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (statute prohibiting polygamy
upheld); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (statute prohibiting polygamy upheld); Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 395 U.S.
6 (1969) (conviction for unlawful possession of narcotics may not be set aside upon defense
that drugs are part of religious practice); United States v. Kissinger, 250 F.2d 940 (3d Cir.)
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 958 (1958) (conviction of farmer under Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938 upheld despite defense that defendant's religious beliefs mandated that he not limit crop
production); United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968) (use of LSD and marijuana in religious services is not protected from criminal prosecution by the first amendment
where an obvious exploitation was intended by defendants).
Numerous state court decisions indicate the same treatment. See Harden v. State, 188
Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948) (statute prohibiting exhibition of poisonous reptiles upheld
even though use of snakes was part of a religiois ceremony); State v. Bullard 267 N.C. 599,
148 S.E.2d 565 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 917 (1967) (conviction for unlawful possession
of narcotics may not be set aside upon defense that drugs are part of religious practice);
People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903) (statute requiring the furnishing of
medical care to a young child upheld).
25. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
26. Id. at 166.
27. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
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However free the exercise of religion may be, it must be subordinate to the criminal laws of the country, passed with reference to
actions regarded by general consent as properly the subjects of
punitive legislation."

The Reynolds and Davis cases comprise the foundation upon which
later free exercise cases were decided by the Court in analyzing the
impact of governmental regulations or limitations upon religious
activity. 9
Following the rationale of Reynolds, the Court in Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire' upheld the defendant's conviction for cursing a
city marshall while distributing literature conveying religious beliefs. The Court noted that even if the activities preceding the cursing incident might be seen as religious in nature, and thereby clearly
protected under the fourteenth amendment, the defendant was not
"cloak[ed] . . . with immunity from the legal consequences for
concomitant acts committed in violation of a valid criminal statute." Fraud and abuse in connection with public solicitation by
religious charities should be similarly devoid of constitutional protections.
Of particular importance to the subject of regulation of religious
charities is Cantwell v. Connecticut.3 2 Cantwell involved the solicitation of charitable contributions by the Jehovah's Witnesses. At
issue was the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute which required all persons soliciting contributions for a religious, charitable,
or philanthropic cause to obtain prior approval from the Secretary
of the Public Welfare Council. In summarizing the protection afforded by the free exercise clause, the Supreme Court interpreted
the first amendment as embracing two concepts-freedom to be28. Id. at 342-43.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1943), which exemplifies the Court's
refinement of the concept of freedom of religious belief. In Ballard, the Court held that while
a jury could not examine the veracity of a belief, it could consider the sincerity with which
the belief was held. Id. at 84.
30. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
31. Id. at 571. See also Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); but see People v. Woody,
61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (record established that the use of peyote,
an otherwise illegal substance, was the cornerstone of the Navajo religion; application of the
statutory prohibition against its use would result in the virtual prohibition of this religion in
violation of the guarantee of the free exercise clause). In Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S.
569 (1941), the Court considered a statute which allowed New Hampshire cities to require
persons parading on public streets to procure a license. The statute was upheld against a free
exercise attack by a Jehovah's witness, despite the fact that it gave the licensing board broad
discretion to grant and revoke licenses. The Court indicated that the secular interest in
promoting the safety of public roads took precedence over an indirect interference with
religion. Id. at 574.
32. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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lieve and freedom to act. Unlike the first, the latter concept cannot
be absolute. Certain conduct remains subject to regulation for the
protection of society. However, "[in every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end,
unduly to infringe the protected freedom.

' '33

The Cantwell Court held that the statute did not withstand the
first amendment challenge because it permitted the Secretary to
withhold approval of solicitation activities upon a determination
that the cause was not religious, not a bona fide object of charity,
or not in conformance with reasonable standards of efficiency and
integrity.3 4 The Court reasoned that a prior restraint, 35 based only

upon a determination that the religious cause in question was not
valid or worthy, violated the first amendment, and concluded that
the state could not make its regulations dependent upon the type
of religious beliefs involved.36
Although holding that the statute in question did not withstand
the free exercise clause attack, the Court indicated that religious
activities or practices may nonetheless be subjected to regulation by
the states:
[A] State may by general and non-discriminatory legislation regulate the times, the places, and the manner of soliciting upon its
streets, and of holding meetings thereon; and may in other respects
33. Id. at 304.
34. Id. at 305.
35. In constitutional terms, the doctrine of "prior restraint" forbids governmental officials
or those acting under color of law from imposing limitations before the fact, with few exceptions, upon modes of expressions guaranteed under the first amendment. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
The major considerations underlying the doctrine of prior restraint are matters of administration, enforcement, and operation, and their effect upon the basic objectives of the first
amendment. Emerson, The Doctrine of PriorRestraint, 20 LAw & CoNrEMP. PROaB. 648 (1955).
In contrast to other doctrines which have developed out of the first amendment, the doctrine
of prior restraint is more precise in its application. According to Emerson:
It does not require the same degree of judicial balancing that the courts have held
to be necessary in the use of the clear and present danger test, the rule against
vagueness, the doctrine that a statute must be narrowly drawn, or the various
formulae of reasonableness. Hence, it does not involve the same necessity for the
court to pit its judgment on controversial matters of economics, politics, or social
theory against that of legislature.
Id.
In the Near case, the Supreme Court's major pronouncement on the doctrine of prior
restraint, it was stated that the first amendment granted protection against prior restraints,
but that the freedom is not absolutely protected. Three different grounds were enunciated
upon which justification for some prior restraint could be predicated: (1) national security in
time of war; (2) in obscenity cases where the requirements of decency are involved; and (3)
where the "security of the community life" requires protection "against incitements to acts
of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government." 283 U.S. at 716.
36. 310 U.S. at 307.
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safeguard the peace, good order and comfort of the community,
without unconstitutionally invading the liberties protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.37

The Court also pointed out that a statute regulating the public
interest of solicitation is not constitutionally objectionable so long
as it "does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds
. . .even though the collection be for a religious purpose."3 8 Furthermore, the decision specifically noted that "a State may protect
its citizens from fraudulent solicitation" by requiring solicitors to
establish their identity and authority to act for the cause which they
purport to represent.3
Application of Cantwell
Cantwell gives strong indication that a statute regulating public
solicitations, designed to protect and promote public safety, peace,
comfort, or convenience will not run afoul of the first amendment
so long as it does not directly inhibit the expression of religious
beliefs. Cases following Cantwell have reaffirmed this principle,' 0
and the test articulated by Cantwell has been applied numerous
times by state and lower federal courts in cases involving the validity of statutes or ordinances regulating the solicitations of charitable
contributions. These cases have generally upheld the right of local
government to regulate religious solicitation activities.
In Gospel Army v. City of Los Angeles," for example, a religious
37. Id. at 304.
38. Id. at 305.
39. Id. at 306.
40. In Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948), the Court held that an ordinance which
allowed the Chief of Police arbitrarily to deny a permit to persons seeking to use loud speaker
equipment in public places was unconstitutional because it involved a prior restraint on the
expression of religious beliefs. The Court noted that a narrow statute, designed to regulate
time, place or noise level, would be constitutionally permissible.
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), is noteworthy for narrowly defining the area
of protected religious conduct while broadly defining the area of legitimate governmental
regulation. The Court stated that only religious activities well established by a religious
organization come within the umbrella of the first amendment, and even these activities are
subject to non-restrictive regulation. The Court implied that a mere registration requirement
or a nominal regulatory fee would be a valid exercise of the police power.
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, rehearingdenied, 321 U.S. 804 (1944), indicates that
even religious which is protected by the free exercise clause may be subjected to governmental
regulation amounting to a prohibition when a countervailing governmental interest of paramount importance is involved. In Prince, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction-for
violating the child labor laws-of an adult member of Jehovah's Witnesses who permitted a
nine-year old girl to sell magazines and solicit charitable contributions. The Court held that
the evils of child labor were not diminished by the fact that the labor was on behalf of a
religious cause, and that the power of the state to protect and control children reached beyond
the scope of its authority over adults. Id. at 170.
41. 27 Cal. 2d 232, 163 P.2d 704 (1945), appeal dismissed, 331 U.S. 543 (1947).
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organization engaged in the solicitation of charitable contributions
argued to the California Supreme Court that enforcement of the
ordinance regulating solicitations would violate the free exercise
clause if applied to them." Even though the plaintiffs contended
that solicitation of charitable contributions was an integral part of
their religious duties, the court upheld the ordinance as a reasonable
exercise of the state's police power:
Activities characteristic of the secular life of the community may
properly be a concern of the community even though they are
carried on by a religious organization .

. .

. Conceivably they may

engage in virtually any wordly activity, but it does not follow that
they may do so as specially privileged groups, free of the regulations that others must observe. If they were given such freedom,
the direct consequence of their activities would be a diminution of
the state's power to protect the public health and safety and the
general welfare. With that power so easily diminished there would
soon cease to be that separation of church and state underlying the
constitutional concept of religious liberty. . ... 3
The Gospel Army court further observed that many charitable activities concern community activities unrelated to religion, and
that there is a public interest in regulating such activities to prevent
fraud." The information required by such a regulation served the
public interest by enabling the public to determine the nature and
value of the purposes for which the solicitation was made.45
The validity of prior restraints of solicitation activity when exercised through a legislative standard designed to prohibit fraudulent
solicitation schemes has also been recognized. In NationalFoundation v. Fort Worth,4" the Fifth Circuit upheld the validity of an
ordinance which required all organizations wishing to solicit charitable funds within Fort Worth to obtain a permit. The ordinance
42. Id. at 238-39, 163 P.2d at 711. The ordinance regulating the solicitation activities
required the filing of a registration statement disclosing the identity of the organization, the
purpose of the solicitation, the manner in which the solicitation would be conducted, and the
percentage breakdown of administrative and fund raising costs in relation to distributions to
the charitable beneficiaries. Permits were automatically issued upon the filing of the required
information. The licensing board could not disallow a proposed solicitation but it could
investigate organizations and publicize its findings. Id., 163 P.2d at 708-09, 711.
43. Id. at 244-45, 163 P.2d at 712.
44. Id. at 246, 163 P.2d at 712-13.
45. Id. at 247. A year later in Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 28 Cal. 2d 460, 171 P.2d
8 (1946), appeal dismissed, 331 U.S. 549 (1947), the California Supreme Court determined
that the same ordinance was valid even though it granted the licensing board the discretion
to prohibit public canister solicitations. The court found this was not a prior restraint based
upon a religious test; it found, instead, that a prohibition would be predicated upon a showing
of fraud or interference with public convenience and safety. Id. at 472, 171 P.2d at 16.
46. 415 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970).
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conditioned the obtaining of the permit upon several requirements,
one of which mandated that the expected cost of solicitation not
exceed a twenty per cent limit, barring special circumstances." In
rejecting the Foundation's contention that the ordinance was a prior
restraint of free speech and free press, the court stated that "[n]o
constitutional right exists to make a public solicitation of funds for
charity" and that "[t]he reasonable regulation of charitable organizations is within a government's police power." 4 8 Furthermore, the
court held that despite the twenty per cent limitation on fund raising costs, the ordinance was a reasonable exercise of the city's police
power.
Although the ordinance considered in National Foundation exempted a church or religious society which solicited solely from its
own membership, a religious organization soliciting from the general public was required to meet the twenty per cent limitation. 9
This standard did not violate the free exercise clause as it was not
a religious test based upon the consideration of religious beliefs.
Twenty years after the "beliefs/practices" dichotomy was articulated in Cantwell, the Supreme Court began revising that notion in
favor of a delicate balancing standard." In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the
Court noted that "in this context belief and action cannot be neatly
confined in logic-tight compartments."'" Weighing the asserted
state interests against the importance of the religious activities
being regulated, the Court considered in great detail the sincerity
and importance of the religious value of the regulated activities
against the necessity, importance and impact of the governmental
52
regulation.
47. Id. at 44. The ordinance provided that the 20% limit could be exceeded upon a showing
of special facts or circumstances.
48. Id. at 45.
49. Id. at 47.
50. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972).
51. 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972).
52. In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), a member of the Seventh-day Adventist
Church contended that the decision of the South Carolina Employment Security Commission
in denying her unemployment benefits because she refused to work on Saturdays violated the
free exercise clause. All of the mills in the area where the plaintiff lived operated a six-day
week and refusal to work on Saturdays was tantamount to a refusal to work at all. Although
the plaintiff was unavailable for work, work was not unavailable. The Court held that the
state's interest in discouraging the filing of fraudulent claims which diluted the unemployment compensation fund was not compelling enough to outweigh the plaintiffs constitutional
claim since it had not been demonstrated that alternative forms of regulation would not
combat such abuses. The Court concluded that even if the statute had a rational relationship
to a colorable state interest, this would not suffice to force a choice between unemployment
benefits and the precepts of one's religion.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court held that Wisconsin's compulsory
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Although the "beliefs/practices" test originating with Reynolds
must be replaced by a balancing test "in some contexts," the fundamental proposition remains-public religious solicitations may be
subjected to governmental regulation requiring registration and financial reporting statements. When a religious fund raising activity
is closely intertwined with the religious beliefs of the members, it is
incumbent upon the religious group to demonstrate both the sincerity and importance of the activity. It is unlikely that many religious
groups could sustain such a burden, as did the Navajos in People
v. Woody,"s or the Amish in Wisconsin v. Yoder.5"
education law was invalid under the free exercise clause as applied to children of the Amish
faith. The children's parents contended that it was contrary to the Amish religion and way
of life to send their children to public schools beyond the eighth grade. In resolving the issue,
the Court determined that the state's admittedly legitimate interest in regulating the duration of basic education must be balanced against the Amish parents' interest in directing the
religious upbringing and education of their children. The Court concluded that "only those
interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate
claims to the free exercise of religion." Id. at 215.
53. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
54. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The Court's analysis of the validity of the Amish's practices is
relevant to the subject of this article. In Yoder the Court described at length how the Amish
had demonstrated that the continuation of their religious beliefs and practices outweighed
any state interest in compulsory high school education. In support of their position the Amish
presented expert witnesses-scholars on religion and education-whose testimony was uncontradicted. The history of the Amish sect was given in some detail. The concept of life aloof
from the world and its values was shown to be central to the Amish faith, and well ingrained
in its 300-year history. The Old Order Amish religion "pervades and determines the entire
mode of life of its adherents." Id. at 210. The Amish objection to formal high school education
was firmly grounded in their central religious concepts, for it took the children out of the
community during a crucial stage in their development. Expert testimony was submitted to
the court stating that compulsory high school attendance "could not only result in great
psychological harm to Amish children . . . but would also . . ultimately result in the
destruction of the Old Order Amish church community .. Id. at 212. Another expert
witness testified that the Amish were successful in preparing their high school age children
to be productive members of the Amish community. Of further importance was evidence that
"[the Amish have an excellent record as law-abiding and generally self-sufficient members
of society." Id. at 212-13. The Court examined the quality of the claims of the Amish and
found important the determination of whether "the Amish religious faith and their mode of
life are, as they claim, inseparable and interdependent." Id. at 215. The claims must be
rooted in religious belief and will not be a barrier to reasonable state regulation if based on
purely secular consideration. The traditional way of life of the Amish sect was shown to be
"one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately related to
daily living." Id. at 216. This way of life did not alter in fundamentals for centuries but
remained constant as the society around them changed. Expert witnesses testified that the
impact of the state compulsory education law on the Amish practice of religion "is not only
severe, but inescapable. . . . It carries with it precisely the kind of objective danger to the
free exercise of religion that the First Amendment was designed to prevent." Id. at 218. The
Court found that the free exercise of the Amish sect's religious beliefs would be gravely
endangered if not destroyed by the state's law. Id. at 219.
The delicate balancing test utilized by the Yoder Court illustrates the process which a court
must now undertake when a regulatory statute is challenged on free exercise grounds. First,
the court must consider whether or not a specific statute represents an infringement of the
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State legislation requiring charitable organizations to file registration and financial reporting statements when engaged in public
solicitation efforts involves a reasonable exercise of state police
power. When analyzed amidst the well-documented and widespread
abuses in the area of charitable solicitations, such legislation should
withstand the constitutional objections considered above even when
the strict scrutiny standard is applied. These laws would be well
within the confines of both Cantwell and the more recent decisions
since they would not be based on religious beliefs.
The cases concerning the free exercise clause indicate that governmental regulation of religious solicitations will withstand challenge
under the free exercise clause so long as the regulation does not: (1)
involve a prior restraint based upon a weighing of religious beliefs;
(2) vest arbitrary authority in those charged with enforcing the regulation; or (3) directly inhibit the propagation of religious beliefs.15
A statute requiring registration and financial statements from all
charities engaged in public solicitations would not contravene these
standards.
THE TAX CASES

Religious organizations are not automatically exempt from tax
liabilities, a fact which is often overlooked. 6 This exemption has
evertheless been well-established in the United States since coIOindividual's constitutional right to the free exercise of religion. The court will try to determine
whether a belief or merely a religious act or practice is infringed upon. The court may also
examine the role a particular belief plays in a group's overall religious scheme. See People v.
Woody, 61 Cal.2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
Next the court considers whether some compelling state interest justifies the infringement
upon the free exercise of religion. Once a bona fide first amendment issue is joined, the
government must shoulder the burden of defending a regulation impacting on religious actions. Stevens v. Berger, 428 F. Supp. 986 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). As the Court has said: "It is basic
that no showing merely of a rationale relationship to some colorable state interest would
suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, '[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitations."' Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 530 (1945) as cited in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
The Supreme Court re-emphasized this norm in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976):
"It is firmly established that a significant impairment of First Amendment rights must
survive exacting scrutiny. . . .[E]ncroachment cannot be justified upon a mere showing of
a legitimate state interest. . . . The interest advanced must be paramount, one of vital
importance, and the burden is on the Government to show the existence of such an interest."
55. See notes 25-54 supra and accompanying text.
56. See Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 707
(1970), where the majority opinion held that a state scheme granting property tax exemptions
to religious organizations did not violate the establishment clause of the first amendment.
See notes 85-94 infra and accompanying text. See also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105 (1943), where the Court, noting such power was not unbridled, stating that "[tihe power
to tax the exercise of a privilege [i.e., the free exercise of religion] is [also] the power to
control or suppress its enjoyment." Id. at 112.
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nial times. 7 Every state accords some tax exemptions to religious
organizations, and the federal tax laws are replete with religious
exemptions.5 8 The constitutionality of thia preferential treatment
continues to be debated. At present, these statutes and the case
law attendant thereto provide an instructive source of authority in
a consideration of the constitutionality of legislation regulating public solicitations by religious organizations.
Tax Exemption and the Free Exercise Clause
The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) exempts from federal income
taxation "Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific . . . or educational purposes. .. ..
"60 Additionally, the

Internal Revenue Service (IRS) excuses "churches, their integrated
auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches" from even
having to apply formally for recognition of their exemption from
income taxation.'
Three distinct issues have been raised as a result of attempts to
tax religious groups. The issues concern the existence and scope of
the exemption, along with the permissible extent of governmental
impact on the activities of these groups.
The Definitional Issue
The terms "religion" and "religious purposes" are not defined by
57. See note 11 supra and note 86 infra and authorities cited therein.
58. State schemes of taxation exempt religious organizations from, inter alia, taxes imposed upon income, property, inheritance and sales. For exemptions under the federal scheme
of taxation, see note 69 infra and accompanying text. See also Van Alstyne, Tax Exemption
of Church Property, 20 OHIo ST. L.J. 461 (1959), where the author, after cataloging constitutional and statutory laws granting tax exemptions to church property, notes that such exemptions are firmly rooted in American law. Additionally, see note 14 supra and accompanying
text.
59. See, e.g., Comment, Religion in Politics and the Income Tax Exemption, 42 FORDHAM
L. REv. 397 (1973) (hereinafter cited as Religion in Politics); Burns, ConstitutionalAspects
of Church Taxation, 9 COLUM. J. LAW & Soc. PROB. 646 (1973); Korbel, Do the FederalIncome
Tax Laws Involve an "Establishment of Religion?", 53 A.B.A.J. 1018 (1967); Note,
Constitutionalityof Tax Benefits Accorded Religion, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 968 (1949).
60. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1970).
61. 26 U.S.C. § 508(c)(1)(A). This provision is an exception to the mandatory notice
requirements of § 508(a), as set forth in Treas. Reg. § 1.508-1(a)(1)(ii), (1976), wherein it is

provided that "[njo organization shall be exempt from taxation under section 501(a) by
reason of being described in section 501(c)(3) whenever such organization is not treated as
described in section 501(c)(3) by reason of section 508(a) and this paragraph." Stated in the
affirmative, Treas. Reg. § 1.508-1(a)(4) (1976) provides that "[any organization excepted
from the requirement of filing notice under section 508(a) will be exempt from taxation under
section 501(c)(3) if it meets the requirements of that section.
...
These special rules with
respect to 501(c)(3) organizations, are applicable to an organization organized after October
9, 1969.
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either the Internal Revenue Code or the Treasury Regulations. 2
Other statutes, case law and revenue rulings are also unenlightening."3 This void may reflect sensitivity to first amendment prohibitions, thereby producing a reluctance to formulate definitions which
could so easily be held unconstitutional." The lack of definitions
also reflects the sometimes vague belief/practices distinction which
was discussed earlier.6 5
Because laws "cannot interfere with mere religious belief and
opinions, '"6 the courts have not perceived themselves at liberty to
engage in a comparison of religious beliefs when addressing government claims that particular activities are not "religious" in the
context of the federal tax statutes. 7 A district court in California
expressed this reluctance in holding against the government:
Neither this Court, nor any branch of this Government, will consider the merits or fallacies of a religion. Nor will this Court compare the beliefs, dogmas, and practices of a newly organized religion with those of an older, more established religion. Nor will the
Court praise or condemn a religion, however excellent or fanatical
or preposterous it may seem. Were the Court to do so, it would
impinge upon the guarantees of the First Amendment.
The court avoided the formulation of a definition and limited its
reasoning to a negatively phrased finding that the operations of the
Universal Life Church were not "substantial activities which do not
further any religious purpose.''6
62. The only attempt to define these terms appears in the Treasury Regulations under §
511 with respect to unrelated business income of exempt organizations, where the term
"church" is defined as including "a religious order or a religious organization if such order or
organization (a) is an integral part of a church, and (b) is engaged in carrying out the
functions of a church ... " Treas. Reg. § 1.511-2(a)(3)(ii) (1972). The Code presently sets
forth 15 basic religious distinctions, rendering consistent interpretation or definition virtually
impossible, as noted in Whelan, "Church" in the Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional
Problems, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 885, 887-89 (1977).
63. See note 67 infra and accompanying text.
64. See Religion in Politics, supra note 59, at 400.
65. See notes 25 and 26 supra and accompanying text.
66. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
67. See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (neither state nor federal governments can constitutionally force an individual to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion);
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), rev'd on other grounds, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (the
Constitution made man's relation to his God no concern of the state); Fellowship of Humanity
v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. 2d 623, 315 P.2d 394 (1957) (in determining validity of tax
exemption based upon religious use of property, content of belief is to be ignored). See also
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
68. Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 770, 776 (E.D. Cal. 1974).
69. Id. The court, in considering what constitutes a "religious purpose," seemingly adopts
the test set forth in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965), wherein the Court stated
"does the claimed belief occupy the same place in the life of the objector [to the draft] as
an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one clearly qualified for exemption?"
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Broad statements such as these open the door to favorable tax
treatment for any organization claiming to be "organized and operated for religious purposes." 70 This amorphous definition together
with the absence of any requirement of formal application for an
exempt status facilitates the potential for abuse-a potential which
7
has become a reality. '

72
Legislative and Political Activities
The charitable organizations described in the IRC are not eligible
for the exemption from federal income tax liability if a "substantial

part of [their] activities . . .is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation . . ." or if they participate

in any political campaign on behalf of a candidate for public office.7

70. Treatment as an exempt religious organization as described in § 501(c)(3) encourages
monetary support of such groups, as it affords deductions to donors in computing income tax
liability, 26 U.S.C. § 170(c) (1970); gift tax liability, 26 U.S.C. § 2522(a)(2) (1970); and estate
tax liability, 26 U.S.C. § 2055(a)(2) (1970).
71. See note 8 supra. The potential for abuse is also heightened by § 6033 of the IRC, 26
U.S.C. § 6033 (1970), where a mandatory exception from filing an annual return with the IRS
is accorded to "churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of
churches" pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6033(a)(2)(A)(i) (1970), and to "the exclusively religious
activities of any religious order" pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6033(a)(2)(A)(iii) (1970). Also, 26
U.S.C. § 6033(a)(2)(A)(ii) (1970) accords this exception to organizations if their gross receipts
do not exceed $5,000 in a taxable year and they fit the organizational description set forth in
the Code.
72. As noted earlier, three distinct issues are raised when examining the constitutionally
permissible extent of government regulation of 501(c)(3) organizations. The second issue
(legislative and political activities) necessarily encompasses the third and will be discussed
together. The third issue concerns the "exclusivity" of the activities of groups which are
organized and operated for one or more exempt purposes, and is focused upon by the courts
when revocation of exempt status is threatened. This occurs because the Treasury Regulations, in defining exempt status, mandate that the exclusive purposes of an organization be
determined under an "organizational test" [Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(1976)], and
"operational test" [Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1)(1976)]. See note 75 infra and accompanying text.
73. The prohibition with respect to the legislative activities of 501(c)(3) organizations was
added in the Revenue Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 680, 700 (1934). The impetus for the addition was
Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930), where gifts to the American Birth Control
League were held not deductible from the donor's income due to the League's activities
concerning repeal of existing contraception laws. Such activities, the court found, precluded
the League from being treated as organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, literary, or educational purposes.
The prohibition with respect to the political activities of 501(c)(3) organizations was added
in the Int. Rev. Code of 1964, 68A Stat. 163 (1954). The Tax Reform Act of 1976, P. L. 94455, 90 Stat. 1720, as codified in § 501(i), effected standards and guidelines as to the permissible extent of lobbying activities by public charities without loss of exempt status. The amendments replace the current standard with respect to legislative activities of 501(c) (3) organizations ("[no] substantial part of the activities..."), with specific percentage limitations on
expenditures made to influence legislation. The limitations are applicable to those organizations which elect to be treated under the new standards. For purposes of this article, it is
sufficient to note that the amendments of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, specifically § 501(i)(5),

19781

Religious Exemptions-Disclosure

879

The possible revocation of a religious organization's exemption because of legislative or political activities may raise first amendment
problems."
Courts first considering this subject addressed the issue of
whether a particular group was organized and operated exclusively
for religious purposes.75 The Tenth Circuit was the first court to
confront the legislative and political limitations of this Internal
Revenue Code exemption. In Christian Echoes National Ministry,
Inc. v. United States,76 the IRS had revoked the tax exempt status
of Christian Echoes. The group proceeded to sue for a refund in
federal court. Christian Echoes was a nonprofit religious corporation
which promoted activities such as religious radio and television
broadcasts, authored publications and engaged in evangelistic camdo not apply to churches or an integrated auxiliary of a church or a convention or association
of churches. Such organizations cannot elect to be treated under the new guidelines, and
therefore remain subject to and governed by the present language contained in § 501(c)(3).
See Weithorn, Practitioners'PlanningGuide to the New Lobbying Rules for Public Charities,
46 J. TAX. 294 (May, 1977).
74. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
... For example, many religious groups speak out on matters under consideration by legislative bodies (e.g., state or
federal funds for abortion) and feel dutybound to do eo. To prohibit such activitiy may
impinge upon the free exercise of one's religion, while to permit some religions to do so, while
forbidding others, would favor one religion over the other, thereby running afoul of the
establishment clause. However, this activity may be deemed consistent with exempt status,
for Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1976). provides that
[tihe fact that an organization, in carrying out its primary purpose, advocates
social or civil changes or presents opinion on controversial issues with the intention
of molding public opinion or creating public sentiment to an acceptance of its view
does not preclude such organization from qualifying under section 501(c)(3) so long
as it is not an "action" organization of any one of the types described in paragraph
(c) (3) of this section.
As defined in Treas, Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (1976), an 'action' organization" is an organization which, as its primary objective, advocates the adoption of a doctrine or theory which
can become effective only by the enactment of legislation. REv. RtnL. 62-71, 1962-1 C.B. 85.
See also note 83 infra.
75. See, e.g., Girard Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1941). Challenges
concerning prohibited political activities and first amendment problems came later. In
Girard, the Third Circuit offered its comments on political-type activities:
Religion includes a way of life as well as beliefs upon the nature of the
world. . . .The step from acceptance by the believer to his seeking to influence
others in the same direction is a perfectly natural one. . .. The next step, equally
natural, is to secure the sanction of organized society for or against certain outward
practices thought to be essential.
Id. at 110. See also Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953). The Court, in reversing the
conviction of a Jehovah's Witnesses minister for delivering a sermon in a public park in
violation of a city ordinance, stated that "it is no business of courts to say that what is a
religious practice or activity for one group is not religion under the protection of the First
Amendment." Id. at 70.
76. 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
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paigns and meetings." The district court found for the group, concluding that all its activities were motivated by sincere religious
convictions,7" and that the IRS revocation of Christian Echoes' exemption had violated its right to the free exercise of religion.79 The
Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the IRS limitations on political
activities were constitutionally valid and that Christian Echoes had
not been denied the free exercise of religion. 0 Christian Echoes'
political activities included appeals to their readers to write congressmen to influence political decisions in Washington; to work in
politics at the precinct level; and to demand a "congressional investigation of biased reporting of major television networks."', The
court was not willing to find that religious organizations must be left
free of any and all legislative restrictions."
ChristianEchoes represents a departure from the previous handsoff attitude of the courts in dealing with the tax exempt status of
religious groups." The case may indicate the watershed between
judicial passivity and active scrutiny of the constitutional limits on
regulation of religious organizations in this context. Christian
Echoes lends strong support to the constitutional validity of the
present proposal-that state governments should and can enact
statutes requiring registration and financial reporting by religious
77. Id. at 852.
78. See text accompanying notes 62 to 71 supra.
79. 470 F.2d at 856-57.
80. In so holding, the court noted: "the free exercise clause of the First Amendment is
restrained only to the extent of denying tax exempt status and then only in keeping with an
overwhelming and compelling Governmental interest: That of guarantying that the wall
separating church and state remain high and firm." Id. at 857.
81. Id. at 855. The Tenth Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion that there must
be specific legislation before Congress in order for the "attempt to influence legislation"
prohibition to take effect. Id. at 854.
82. Id. at 856-57.
83. The Christian Echoes holding was such a departure from previous cases that many
commentators have concluded that the limitations on the legislative activities of 501(c)(3)
religious organizations are unconstitutional on their face. See note 59 supra. This position is
summarized succinctly in Persons, Osborn & Feldman, IV Criteria For Exemption Under
Section 501(c)(3) 1909,(1962-63) Research Papers Sponsored by The Commission on Private
Philanthropy and Public Needs (Department of the Treasury, 1977). The major arguments
advanced in support of the unconstitutionality of the legislative limitations language contained in § 501(c)(3), include, inter alia: (1) that the limiting language, as written, is void
for vagueness and overbreadth; (2) that legislative activity is protected by the first amendment; (3) that legislative activity may be so enmeshed in the furtherance of the religious
purposes of an organization, that to prohibit it would be to deny the free exercise of that
organization's religion; and (4) that tax benefits cannot be denied on the basis of exercising
one's first amendment rights. It should also be noted that in passage of the Tax Reform Act
of 1976, Pub.L.No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1722, the Congressional Committee report, while acknowledging the Christian Echoes litigation, stated that its actions were not to be regarded as an
approval or disapproval of the decision of the Tenth Circuit, or of any of the reasoning leading
to that decision.
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groups. The Tenth Circuit's summary dismissal of the free exercise
claim raised by Christian Echoes should encourage the passage of
such legislation by reinforcing the constitutional permissibility of
legislative attempts to repeal the current exemptions afforded religious charities under state solicitation statutes.
Tax Exemption and the Establishment Clause
After bypassing several opportunities,8 4 the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of tax exemptions for religious organizations in Walz v. Tax Commission. 5 The Court held that property
tax exemptions granted to religious organizations did not violate the
establishment clause." The importance of the Walz decision lies in
its articulation of a new standard to be applied in considering the
permissible extent of governmental regulation of religious organizations under the first amendment.
Prior to Walz, the relevant test consisted of a twofold inquiry:
whether the statute reflected a secular legislative purpose,17 and
whether its primary effect was to advance or inhibit religion."8 The
Walz Court, however, found a need to extend the inquiry to be sure
that "the end result-the effect-is not an excessive government
84. See, e.g., Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d 644, 298 P.2d 1, appeal
dismissed, 352 U.S. 921 (1956); General Fin. Corp. v.Archetto, 93 R.I. 392, 176 A.2d 73 (1961),
appeal dismissed, 369 U.S. 423 (1962); Swallow v. United States, 325 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.),
appeal dismissed, 377 U.S. 951 (1963); Murray v. Comptroller of Treasury, 241 Md. 383, 216
A.2d 897, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 816 (1966). Each of these cases involved the constitutionality
of tax exemptions granted religious organizations, and each had been resolved in favor of
exemption by the lower court.
85. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
86. Id. at 679-80. The Court noted that up to 1885, reflecting more than a century of this
country's history and practice, ithad accepted the proposition that federal or state grants of
tax exemption to churches were not violative of the religion clauses of the first amendment.
In 1886, inGibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404, 408 (1886), the Court stated: "In
the exercise of this [taxing] power, Congress, like any State legislature unrestricted by
constitutional provisions, may, at its discretion, wholly exempt certain classes of property
from taxation, or may tax them at a lower rate than other property." In recent years, commentators have divided into pro-exemption and anti-exemption camps with respect to the
desirability and constitutionality of property tax exemptions granted to religious organizations. See, e.g., Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285 (1969); D.
KELLEY, WHY CHURCHES SHOULD NOT PAY TAXES (1977); Comment, Constitutionality of Tax
Exemptions Accorded American Church Property, 30 ALB. L. REV. 58 (1966); Gabler & Shannon, IV The Exemption of Religious, Educational,and CharitableInstitutionsFrom roperty
Taxation 2535, 2543-55, Research Papers Sponsored by The Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs (Department of the Treasury, 1977). The authors neither join in this
debate, nor express their positions relative to it.
87. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
1 (1947).
88. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963).
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entanglement with religion. The test is inescapably one of degree." '89
Using this test, the Court found there was no nexus between tax
exemption and establishment of religion, concluding that exemption, rather than taxation, served to minimize the involvement between church and state."
The Walz Court did not hold that the constitution required that
religious groups be given property tax exemptions. Rather, the
Court's decision reflected its deference to the history and practice
of granting such exemptions." The Court found that neither the
history nor the practice of granting exemptions encouraged a movement towards an established church or religion. 2 The Court emphasized that the first amendment neither says, nor can be interpreted
to mean, that "in every and all respects there shall be a separation
of Church and State." 3 This observation enabled the Court to dis89. 397 U.S. at 674. As noted by Mr. Chief Justice Burger, in the analysis and application
of these "tests," "there is no single constitutional caliper that can be used to measure the
precise degree." Rather, "viewed as guidelines," these tests should consider "the cumulative
criteria developed over many years and applying to a wide range of governmental action
challenged as violative of the Establishment Clause." Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 67778 (1971), cited with approval in Committee For Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 773 n.31 (1973).
90. 397 U.S. at 675. For the Walz Court, exemption, and not taxation, was the fiscal
relationship which tended to reinforce the desired separation of church and state by insulating one from the other. Id.
91. Although quick to point out that "no one acquires a vested or protected right in
violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that span of time covers our entire
national existence and indeed predates it," Id. at 678, the Court tempered this statement by
reference to comments by Mr. Justice Holmes, in concluding that "an unbroken practice of
according the exemption to churches, openly and by affirmative state action, not covertly or
by state inaction, is not something to be lightly cast aside." Id. In New York Trust Co. v.
Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921), Mr. Justice Holmes remarked that "a page of history is worth
a volume of logic," and later, in Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922), he stated:
"If a thing has been practised for two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong
case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it.
...
That the historical underpinnings of
tax exemptions played a significant role in the Walz Court's decision cannot be denied, for
tax benefits for parents whose children attend parochial school were disallowed in Nyquist,
being termed "a recent innovation" without historical precedent. 413 U.S. at 792.
92. Rather than leading to an established church or religion, the Court observed that our
two centuries of according religion uninterrupted freedom from taxation "has operated affirmatively to help guarantee the free exercise of all forms of religious belief." 397 U.S. at
678. The Court also noted the difficulties in reconciling the two religion clauses of the first
amendment:
The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment are not the
most precisely drawn portions of the Constitution. The sweep of the absolute prohibitions in the Religion Clauses may have been calculated; but the purpose was to
state an objective, not to write a statute. In attempting to articulate the scope of
the two Religion Clauses, the Court's opinions reflect the limitations inherent in
formulating general principles on a case-by-case basis.
Id. at 668. Also writing for the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971), Mr.
Chief Justice Burger referred to the language of the religion clauses as being "at best opaque."
93. 397 U.S. at 669, citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952). Mr. Chief Justice
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tinguish exemption from direct aid, finding that exemptions tended
to complement and reinforce the separation of church and state. 4
In cases raising establishment clause issues, the Court focuses on
the concerns against which the clause was designed to protect-'"sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of
the sovereign in religious activity."" Though these concepts may
seem clear, the boundaries of permissible government activity in
this area are only dimly perceived." Thus the Court will examine
"the form of the relationship for the light that it casts on the substance."97
Refinement and application of the Walz "excessive entanglement
test" has occurred primarily in actions challenging the constitutionality of public aid to church-related schools. 8 In these cases, the
Court has stated that "we must examine the character and purposes
Burger, writing for the Wclz Court, observed that the Court had struggled to find a neutral
course between the two religion clauses, yet "[tihe course of constitutional neutrality in this
area cannot be an absolutely straight line; rigidity could well defeat the basic purpose of these
provisions, which is to insure that no religion be sponsored or favored, none commanded, and
none inhibited." Id. The Court had long ago rejected the argument, in Bradfield v. Roberts,
175 U.S. 291 (1899), that every form of financial aid to church-sponsored activity violated
the religion clauses. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 678, 679 (1971).
94. In the context of exemption or taxation, "separation" was not interpreted by the Court
to mean absence of all contact, as the complexities of modern life are not conducive to such.
For as the Court points out, "n]o perfect or absolute separation is really possible; the very
existence of the Religion Clauses is an involvement of sorts-one that seeks to mark boundaries to avoid excessive entanglement. 397 U.S. at 670. Mr. Chief Justice Burger also noted
that the general principle deducible from the first amendment is "that we [the Court] will
not tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental interference with
religion. Short of those expressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for play in the
joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist
without sponsorship and without interference." Id. at 669.
95. Id. at 668.
96. Id. at 678. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971), where the Court stated:
A law "respecting" the proscribed result, that is, the establishment of religion, is
not always easily identifiable as one violative of the Clause. A given law might not
establish a state religion but nevertheless be one "respecting" that end in the sense
of being a step that could lead to such establishment and hence offend the First
Amendment.
97. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971). This examination is both necessary and
inevitable, as the line of separation between church and state, "far from being a 'wall,' is a
blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular
relationship." Id.
98. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works
Bd., 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Wheeler v. Barrera, 417
U.S. 402 (1974); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Although posing considerations and subtleties distinct from tax exemptions, the analyses of
the subsidies involved in these cases are equally applicable to a Walz-like exemption case.
See generally Note, Tax Exemptions, Subsidies and Religious Freedom after Walz v. Tax
Commission, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 876, 900-06 (1970).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 9

of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the
State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority."99 The Walz Court construed tax
exemption as a fiscal relationship designed to minimize entanglement between church and state.' ° In contrast, the Court in Lemon
v. Kurtzman'0 ' found that direct aid from the state involved surveillance and audit powers carrying the dangerous potential of excessive
government supervision of church schools. The legislation was found
to violate the establishment clause.
Because the "test" is inescapably one of degree,'10 the Court has
acknowledged that "while some involvement and entanglement are
inevitable, lines must be drawn.'

' 03

The difficulties in drawing such

lines are apparent. Application of the tripartite Walz test therefore
must be limited in scope and effect to a case-by-case analysis of the
facts presented.' 4
In the event that statutes are passed requiring religious groups
engaged in public solicitations to register with the state, such groups
might raise the Walz prohibition against "excessive entanglement"
as a bar to the enforcement of such statutes.' 5 Application of the
tripartite test demonstrates that this argument is not tenable.
As discussed earlier,1"6 the government has a paramount interest
in enacting and implementing such a statutory scheme. This interest is found in the state's power to protect public health, safety and
general welfare. Furthermore, such legislation would reflect a secular legislative purpose, satisfying the first prong of the test.'07 No one
religion would be singled out; all those engaged in public solicitation
of contributions would be treated and classified in the same manner.' 0

The second prong of the test is also satisfied in that the primary
effect of the statute would be neither the advancement nor the
inhibition of religion.' 9 However, religious groups would undoubt99. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971).
100. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970).
101. 403 U.S. at 621.
102. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
103. 403 U.S at 625.
104. See note 92 supra.
105. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970). See text accompanying notes 97103 supra.
106. See text accompanying notes 43-45 supra.
107. See note 87 supra and accompanying text. See also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97, 106 (1968).
108. This analysis parallels that of the Walz Court's consideration of the legislative purpose of a property tax exemption. 397 U.S. at 672.
109. See note 88 supra and accompanying text. See also Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
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edly claim that the legislation inhibited their religious and fund
raising activities in violation of the free exercise clause."' Like the
free exercise claim summarily dismissed in ChristianEchoes," it is
equally clear that religion is neither advanced nor inhibited by mandatory filing of registration and financial statements. Fund raising
cannot be equated with the free exercise of religion; and public
disclosure of fund raising practices, along with the attendant public
accountability," 2 do not come within the scope of constitutional
protections of religion.
The third and final prong of the Walz test-whether the statute
fosters excessive government entanglement with religion" 3-is directed at the prohibitions of the establishment clause. Whether a
statute fosters unconstitutional "excessive entanglement," or
whether it promotes only inevitable involvement between the state
and the church is the issue to be addressed."'
As noted by the Supreme Court in Roemer v. Maryland Public
Works Board,"' "entanglement is essentially a procedural problem,""' 6 and three factors must be considered: (1) the character and
purposes of the benefited institutions; (2) the nature of the aid; and
(3) the resulting relationship between government and the religious
authority."7 A requirement that religious organizations file registration and financial statements would neither benefit nor aid such
groups within the meaning of the first two factors. The third factor
has been defined as a consideration of "whether the involvement is
excessive, and whether it is a continuing one calling for official and
continuing surveillance ... .""IThe filing of a registrationstatement would be a one-time occurrence and would thus seem to be
outside the "excessive" category.
However, filing of financial statements on an annual basis would
probably provide the greatest potential for excessive governmental
entanglement. The danger which has become apparent in the past
involves state aid to religious schools. This type of aid is subject to
surveillance by the granting authority to ensure that the funds be
110. See notes 25-54 supra and accompanying text, wherein the free exercise claims of
religious organizations resulting from the abrogation of this exemption have been considered.
111. 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973). See notes 77-82 supra
and accompanying text.
112. See note 120 infra and accompanying text.
113. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
114. See note 96 supra and accompanying text.
115. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
116. Id. at 755.
117. Id. at 762-63. See also note 99 supra and accompanying text.
118. 397 U.S. at 675.
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applied to secular purposes. In this situation a great deal of control
lies with the party exercising the pursestrings, and an impermissible
degree of government entanglement with the religious recipients is
thereby fostered. " '
The filing of financial statements by religious groups would serve
to assure the public that solicited funds are actually being used for
the stated purposes. Such statements would not serve to involve
government in the "essentially religious activities of religious organizations. 1 20 The states would instead be concerned with the secular
fund raising activities of religious groups. To conclude that this type
of involvement violates the establishment clause is not the logical
extension of the Walz "excessive entanglement" test. 12 1
RECOMMENDATIONS

Religious charities solicited nearly $13 billion in 1976, approximately half of which was allocated for secular purposes. Practically
speaking, these religious charities are indistinguishable from secular
122
charities in terms of functions performed and beneficiaries served.
Nevertheless, financial accountability and disclosure regulations
are staggeringly minimal in the religious sector when compared to
the accountability required of secular charities.
The existence of significant fraud and abuse in solicitation practices of religious charities demands that state statutes be enacted
providing for registration and financial disclosure. 3 Christian
119. As the pursestrings are normally closely guarded and tightly drawn, the evil of
various religious organizations competing among themselves for monetary benefits persists,
thereby creating the "risk of politicizing religion" in attempting to secure these funds. (Opinion of Justice Harlan in Walz, 397 U.S. at 695). As noted in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 622 (1971): "political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against
which the First Amendment was intended to protect." Thus, the prohibition of the establishment clause's "excessive entanglement test" encompasses state programs with "successive
and very likely permanent annual appropriations that benefit relatively few religious groups,"
which by their nature create divisive political potential and "[plolitical fragmentation . . .
on religious lines." Id. at 623.
120. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 658 (1971) (opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan).
121. See note 103 supra.
122. Herman, Legislative Impact on Charitable Giving, 116 TRUSTS & ESTATES 794 (December, 1977). Religious organizations received $12.84 billion in contributions in 1976. Nearly
43% of all charitable contributions are donated to religious causes or organizations. Giving
U.S.A. 1976 Report, American Association of Fund Raising Counsel (New York). However,
the percentage that is solicited from the general public for non-sacramental purposes, as
contrasted to funds raised as sacramental donations, most likely amounts to one-half of $6.5
billion. See I A Study of Religious Receipts and Expenditures in the United States, Interfaith
Research Committee of Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs 365-450.
123. See Church, State and Fund-Raising, PHILANTHROPY MONTHLY (November, 1977)
(Members of the National Association of Attorneys General Committee on Charitable Trusts
and Solicitations plan to modify the religious exemptions of state charitable solicitation
statutes.).
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Echoes supports the contention that the implementation of such
statutes would encompass neither an examination into the beliefs,
doctrines, tenets or merits of a religion, nor involve a comparison of
the beliefs of one religious group with another. State regulation
would reflect the fund raising practices of the soliciting charity.
Existing Regulation
A few states presently have statutes which regulate public solicitation by religious organizations. Until 1976, the Maryland solicitation statute"4 did not apply to "religious corporations."', 5 The statprimarily as a result of the Pallottine
ute was amended in 211976,
6
scandal in that state.
Maryland's new statute exempts some organizations from its registration and financial disclosure requirements. The exemption is
based upon types of fund raising activities 7 rather than whether the
group is secular or religious. Some organizations are exempt from
registration requirements if they "do not employ a professional solicitor. . . or if they do not mail more than 500,000 solicitations...
in any one year. .. ."2 The list of organizations eligible for the
exemption includes a "bona fide religious organization" which presently holds a federal tax exemption.12 9 Nevertheless, charities claiming an exemption must still register an exemption claim with the
3
Secretary of State. 1
The statute provides for a twenty five percent limit on income
used for expenses, although the Secretary of State is authorized to
make exceptions. 131 Finally, violations of the statute constitute misdemeanors, for which a maximum fine of $5,000 or a one year sent32
ence may be imposed.
124. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 103A et seq. (1971), as amended, art. 41, §§ 103A et seq.
(1977 Supp.).
125. Id. at § 103D. Charitable organizations in general were also exempt if they did not
receive contributions exceeding $2,500 during the fiscal year so long as two additional requirements were met: the organization's fundraising could not be carried on by a paid professional,
and none of the organization's assets or income could be paid to any officer or member of the
organization. Id.
126. See, e.g., F. Barbash, Maryland Starts Probe Into Pallottines, Wash. Post, Jan. 7,
1976, at Al, col. 1.
127. MD. CODE ANN. art. 41, § 103C(a) (1977 Supp.).
128. Id.
129. Id. at § 103C(a)(6).
130. Id. at § 103C(b). The exemption claim must include the name, address, and purpose
of the organization, together with "a statement setting forth the reason for the claim for
exemption." Id.
131. Id. at § 103D(a). More than 25% of income may be used for expenses "where the 25%
limitation would effectively prevent the charitable organization from raising contributions."
Id.
132. Id. at § 103L(a). The Secretary may also cancel the registration of the violator. Id.
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North Carolina until recently exempted religious organizations
which solicit only from their own membership, with the qualification that "membeiships" not be granted to persons making a contribution as a result of a solicitation. '3 However, amendments effective in 1975 greatly expanded the statute's length and specificity.
Unlike Maryland, North Carolina has attempted to define a religious organization in terms of its activities. The following description is found in the list of exempt persons:
A religious corporation, trust, or organization incorporated or established for religious purposes, or other religious organizations
which serve religion by the preservation of religious rights and
freedom from persecution or prejudice or by the fostering of religion, including the moral and ethical aspects of a particular religious faith: Provided, however, that such religious corporation,
trust or organization established for religious purposes shall not be
exempt from filing a license application with respect to secular
activites [sic], nor shall such religious corporation, trust or organization established for religious purposes be exempt from filing
a license application if its financial support is derived primarily
from contributions solicited from persons other than its own members, excluding sales of printed or recorded religious materials:
Provided further, however, that no part of the net income of which
inures to the benefit of any individual and that the organization
had received a declaration of current tax-exempt status as a religious organization from the government of the United States.3 4
"Religious purposes" is in turn defined as "maintaining or propagating religion or supporting public religious services, according to
the rites of a particular denomination.' ' 35 By limiting the exemption
to religious groups whose financial support comes "primarily" from
its own members, North Carolina is compelling the registration of
any religious group which engages in significant public solicitations.
North Carolina also attempts to supervise the use of professional
fund raisers: the application for licensure must identify the group's
professional solicitors together with the compensation they are to be
paid; 3 solicitors must be separately licensed and post bond; 37 contracts between professional solicitors and charitable organizations
at § 103L(b)(1).
133. N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§§ 108-67 to 108-75, repealed by N.C. GEN.

(1977 Supp.).
134. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-75.7 (1977 Supp.).
135. Id. at § 108-75.3(17).
136. Id. at § 108-75.6(11).
137. Id. at § 108-75.8.

STAT. §§

108-75.1 et seq.

19781

Religious Exemptions-Disclosure

must be filed with the state;'3 and, finally, the solicitor may not be
paid more than five percent of the gross amount of money or other
property raised or received.' 39
The state may revoke or suspend a license if it finds that solicitation expenses have exceeded thirty-five percent of moneys raised.14 0
First offenders may be fined $100-$500 and/or imprisoned for not
more than six months.' 4 ' This statute is presently under challenge
on the basis of the religion clauses of the first amendment.'42
Examples of the more common form of solicitation statutes as
applied to religious groups include those of Minnesota and Pennsylvania. Minnesota provides a blanket exemption for religious groups
unless a professional fund raiser is used.' "Professional fund
raiser" does not include an officer or employee of the organization
unless his compensation is computed on the basis of funds to be
raised.' Pennsylvania's statute was amended in 1972 to provide for
more extensive regulation of charities in general,'4 5 but religious
groups retain a blanket exemption so long as (1) "no part of the net
income . . . inures to the direct benefit of any individual," and (2)
the group must hold federal tax exempt status.'4 6
Carefully drafted statutes eliminating the current distinctions
between secular and religious fund raising would withstand constitutional challenge. The following proposed definitions of
'contribution" and "membership" may dissuade any contention
that the statute is impinging upon constitutionally protected activities.
CONCLUSION

Some governmental involvement in the affairs of religious organizations is inevitable and has already been recognized and accepted
by the courts. That which is proposed here, even more than being
inevitable and constitutional, is desirable. An examination of recent
fund raising practices of many religious organizations, while not a
majority, leads inexorably to the conclusion that the public, as well
as religious organizations themselves, would have much to gain from
138. Id. at § 108-75.10(b).
139. Id. at § 108-75.11(a).
140. Id. at § 108-75.18(6).
141. Id. at § 108-75.22(d).
142. Heritage Village Church & Missionary Fellowship, Inc. v. North Carolina, No. 77
CUS 6460 (General Court of Justice Super. Ct. Div. 1977).
143. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 309.515 (e), subd. 2 (1978 Supp.).
144. Id. at § 309.50, subd. 6 (1969).
145. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 160-1.1 et. seq. (Purdon 1977-78 Supp.).
146. Id. at § 160-2(1) (Purdon 1965).
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public disclosure mandated by statutes currently applicable to solicitation activities by secular charities. If the scandals which have
periodically surfaced with religious fund raising activities in recent
years continue, religious charities may soon-if they have not already-suffer the loss of credibility upon which all philanthropic
giving is based.
In all other segments of commercial and philanthropic enterprise,
the consumer has been afforded a system of public disclosure and
accountability for monies expended, invested or donated.'47 This has
resulted from either legislative or judicial pronouncement. Yet, with
the billions of dollars of donations made annually to religious charities, the only safeguard for the charitable donor is the good faith of
the donee charity. Public accountability should no longer rest
within the discretion of the soliciting religious charities. State legislatures should follow the lead of North Carolina and Maryland and
take action to repeal the exemptions currently afforded religious
organizations to ensure that the public and the ultimate charitable
beneficiaries are protected.'48
147. See, e.g., the statutes cited in Abernathy, supra note 4; the Ohio Consumer Sales
Practices Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.01 et seq. (Anderson 1977 Supp.), regulating
consumer transactions; and Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1976), regulating
various aspects of stock transactions.
148. While this article, in the main, attempts to describe the constitutional limits of
permissible governmental regulation of religious fundraising activities and the need for basic
financial disclosure of such activities, it is nonetheless helpful to consider proposed statutory
provisions which the authors believe would abrogate the religious exemption in most of the
current state solicitations statutes. First, the basic definition of "charitable organization"
would be as follows:
Section
A. "Charitable Organization" means a person which is or holds itself out to be
a benevolent, religious, educational, philanthropic, humane, civic, or patriotic organization, or any person who solicits or obtains contributions solicited from the
public for charitable purposes. A chapter, branch, area office or similar affiliate or
any person soliciting contributions within the State for a charitable organization
which has its principal place of business outside the State shall be a charitable
organization for the purposes of this statute.
B. "Charitable purpose" means any benevolent, religious, educational, philanthropic, humane, civic or patriotic purpose.
C. "Person" means any individual, organization, trust, foundation, group, association, partnership, corporation, society, or any combination of them.
D. "Contribution" means the promise, promise to pay, payment, or grant of any
money, services, credit, or property of any kind or value or any combination of
these, except payments by membbers of an organization for membership fees, dues,
fines, assessments, sacerdotal or sacramental donations or services rendered to
individual members, if membership in such organization confers a bona fide right,
privilege, professional standing, honor or other direct benefit, other than the right
to vote, elect officers, or hold office, and except money or property received from
any governmental authority.
E. "Membership" means that for the payment of fees, dues, or assessments or
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for purpose of affiliation with a religious organization an organization provides
services and confers a bona fide right, privilege, professional standing, honor or
other direct benefit, other than the right to vote, elect officers, or hold office. The
term "membership" shall not include those persons who are granted a membership
upon making a contribution as the result of solicitation.
Thus, the qualifying terminology is found in the definitions of "contribution" and
"membership" which remove from regulation, sacramental and sacerdotal donations. These
definitions, in the author's opinion, carve a constitutionally permissible scope for financial
reporting on the part of religious organizations.
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